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 Australia’s  principal  container ports, located in its state capitals, are owned and 
operated by state authorities that largely return profits from port operations to state 
governments.  Since they govern the volumes of trade in most merchandise, they 
command immense influence over the openness and flexibility of the national economy.  
In this study, we estimate the elasticities of substitution between services of ports in 
Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne.  We also examine the pricing of port services to 
estimate the extent of their interaction, from which we derive conjectural variations 
parameters to assess the actual and potential levels of price collusion.  The results 
confirm that there is considerable potential for destructive oligopoly behaviour and that 
pricing by the apparently isolated Port of Melbourne has been effectively controlled by 
price-cap regulation.  The services of the ports of Sydney and Brisbane are 
comparatively substitutable, however.  Although their regulation appears to be less 
restrictive, this substitutability appears to result in some level of competition, which aids 
in the control of pricing. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Australia’s  principal  container ports are located in its state capitals.  They are 
owned and operated by state authorities that largely return profits from port operations 
to state governments.  Since they govern the volumes of trade in most merchandise, they 
command immense influence over the openness and flexibility of the national economy.  
The ports of the east coast are operated by the Port of Melbourne Corporation, the 
Sydney Ports Corporation and the Port of Brisbane Corporation.  They are the largest 
players in the Australian container ports industry and together they hold market shares 
totalling approximately 80%
1.  Although these ports tend to serve different hinterlands, 
land transport networks are sufficiently extensive that their markets overlap.  It might 
therefore be assumed that their pricing decisions affect their respective throughput 
volumes both through their influence over total trade flows and via substitution between 
ports. 
In this study we use data on quantities exchanged in ports, prices charged for 
their services and final demand by state
2 to estimate pair-wise elasticities of substitution 
between the services of East Coast ports.  We also derive conjectural variations 
parameters to measure the extent of price collusion between ports.  These estimates are 
                                                 
1 According to data supplied by the Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities (AAPMA)  
the market shares in containerised trade in financial year 2004/2005, measured in both full and empty 
Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), exchanged were: Port of Melbourne- 36.9%, Sydney Ports- 
26.6%, Port of Brisbane- 14.0%, Port of Fremantle- 9.0%, Others- 13.5%.  
2 Final demand is a measured proxy for state GDP. 
  2put into a wider modelling framework to back out estimates for overall demand 
elasticities for port services and, subsequently, draw conclusions about the ports’ 
optimal pricing behaviour in the absence of regulation.  Our main finding is that 
elasticities of substitution are quite small and hence that there is considerable scope for 
use of the monopoly power in the container ports industry. 
Among the studies of oligopolistic markets based on the conjectural variations 
approach the benchmark is a paper by Iwata (1974).  He studied firm behaviour in the 
Japanese flat glass industry in the period from 1956 to 1965.  Brander and Zhang (1990) 
applied the notion of conjectural variations to the set of duopoly airline routes in the 
United States while a similar approach was used by Bresnahan (1987) to study the 
American automobile industry in the 1950’s.  Another line of research in this area has 
been aimed at estimating the elasticities of substitution between imported and 
domestically produced goods (the so-called Armington elasticities).  For Australia, these 
were estimated by Alaouze, Marsden and Zeitsch (1977) as part of the project financed 
by the Industries Assistance Commission.  Welsch (2006) studied Armington elasticities 
for France during 1970-1997 and found that, while initially the level of substitutability 
between home production and imports was rising for most commodity groups, it 
consistently fell after the 1980s.  The explanation offered for this was that, following 
trade liberalization in the 1970s, imports provided closer substitutes for home 
production.  However, with the passage of time, free trade induced intra-industry 
specialization that led to home production having different structures and increased 
differentiation from imports so the level of substitutability started to decline. 
Our approach is different from these previous studies primarily because it 
focuses on estimating the elasticity of substitution for varieties distinguished not by 
country of production but by firm.  Also, our elasticities are part of a larger modelling 
framework, enabling us to draw conclusions about the pricing behaviour of the firms in 
the container port sector in Australia.  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
offers a brief introduction to the market structure of Australia’s East Coast port sector, 
Section 3 presents a generic model of a price interacting oligopoly with firm specific 
differentiated products.  Section 4 describes the data.  Elasticities of substitution and 
conjectural variations parameters are estimated in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.  These 
estimates are then used to draw inferences about mark-ups charged which are discussed 
in Section 7.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
  32. Australia’s East Coast Ports 
Ports play a very important role in Australian trade since 98% of internationally 
exchanged goods are shipped through them.  In fiscal year 2004/05 Australian ports 
handled about 700 million tonnes of trade out of which 576 million tonnes were exports 
and 121 million tonnes were imports.  Although containerised throughput comprises 
only 6.8% of total throughput in terms of mass tonnage (4.4% in exports and 18.3% in 
imports) its unit value is usually much higher than that of bulk cargo so that more than 
half the value of shipped merchandise is containerised
3. 
Among ports handling containers, those in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane are 
the largest players with respective shares of 37, 27 and 14 per cent of total containerised 
trade in Australia.  At the same time, they are by far the largest market players on the 
East Coast with the next biggest competitor, the port in Newcastle, having only a 0.2 per 
cent share in the market
4.  Our focus is therefore on the three East Coast ports, each of 
which is managed and operated by a separate state- owned corporation: the Port of 
Melbourne Corporation (created out of a merger between the Melbourne Port 
Corporation and the Victorian Channel Authority in July 2003), the Sydney Ports 
Corporation and the Port of Brisbane Corporation. 
Furthermore, starting from 1995, the Port of Melbourne is subject to regulation 
by the Essential Services Commission (ESC, until 2001 the Office of the Regulator 
General).  According to the Port Services Act of 1995 the ESC has a prerogative to 
regulate the prices of the following “prescribed” services within the port of Melbourne: 
•  the provision of channels for use by shipping 
•  the making available of berths, buoys or dolphins in connection with the 
berthing of vessels 
•  the provision of short term storage or cargo marshalling facilities in connection 
with the loading or unloading of vessels at adjacent berths, buoys or dolphins
5. 
                                                 
3 The Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE) published data indicate that the average 
value of container cargoes in Australia’s sea-borne exports and imports during 1999-2000 was 
approximately $3,000 per tonne.  This was roughly twice the average value of general and roll-on-roll-off 
cargoes (when combined), ten times the average value of liquid bulk cargoes, and as much as 45 times the 
average value per tonne of dry bulk cargoes.  See BTRE Information Paper 47, Table 4.7. 
4 All the figures used here are based on data for fiscal year 2004/05 gathered from the Association of 
Australian Ports and Marine Authorities (AAPMA) web page trade statistics 
http://aapma.org.au/tradestats/, accessed March- June 2006.  Other large container ports include the Port 
of Fremantle (9.0% share), Tasmanian ports: Port of Devonport and Burnie Port as well as the Port of 
Adelaide (all of them with shares between 3 and 4%). 
5 These “prescribed” services were subject to price-cap regulation.  See: Essential Services Commission- 
Regulatory Framework, http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/ports88.html accessed March- June 2006. 
  4The regulatory authority for the Port of Brisbane Corporation is the Queensland 
Competition Authority formed under the Queensland Competition Authority Act of 
1997.  Its obligations in relation to ports include access regulation and “investigating 
and monitoring of prices for ports declared for monopoly prices oversight”.
6  
Consequently, the regulatory framework for the Port of Brisbane Corporation is much 
more “light-handed” and does not include price-caps.  The port of Sydney is still more 
lightly regulated.  The Sydney Ports Corporation is not supervised by any formal 
regulatory authority. 
 
3. Price-Interacting Oligopolists 
 Consider  an  economy  with  i=1,N industries that are in turn made up of   
companies respectively.  As we are concentrating here on the services sector it is 
assumed that all supply comes only from domestic producers – there can be no imports 
of port services.  Consumers choose the quantity of each generic product i.  Their 
objective, when choosing the bundle  , is to maximize their utility, 
i n
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  In the second step consumers decide on the varietal composition of their 
consumption of each generic good - they choose the quantities consumed coming from 
different firms.  They are assumed to sub-aggregate product varieties of different firms 
with the elasticity of substitution,  i σ .  For each generic good i they choose   
so as to minimize the expenditure: 
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6 Queensland Competition Authority- Ports, http://www.qca.org.au/ports/ accessed March- June 2006. 
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and   is the market share of firm j in sector i while  ij s i σ is the elasticity of substitution 
between varieties supplied by different firms in sector i. 
The first step is just the standard consumer problem with Cobb-Douglas utility.  
This yields the familiar Marshallian demands for the generic goods: 
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where  i α  is the reference expenditure share of sector i.  Solving for the second step 



































With this demand function in mind, we can proceed to find the elasticity of demand for 
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where  ij µ  is the conjectural variations parameter that reflects the expectation of firm j in 
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From this (and substituting (8) for  ) we can derive the expression for the elasticity of 
demand
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As all producers are the unique suppliers of their product varieties, each of them finds it 
optimal to behave like a monopolist in its product market.  Therefore prices charged by 













where   is the average variable cost for producer j.  ij v
  7  Expressions (12) and (13) are then employed as follows.  We first estimate the 
pair-wise elasticity of substitution, i σ , between services of ports in Brisbane, Sydney 
and Melbourne and, by examining pricing behaviour directly, the conjectural variations 
parameters ( i µ ).  We then use equation (12) to estimate the overall demand elasticity 
for the services of each port.  Finally, we apply equation (13) to see the implications of 
our estimates for optimal pricing behaviour of ports authorities in the absence of 
regulation. 
 
4. Data Description 
The data for the number of containers in Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) 
exchanged and fees charged by the ports comes from the Waterline magazine published 
by the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE).  It is published semi-
annually and covers the period from July 1993 to June 2005, yielding altogether 24 
observations.  Data on state final demand
7 was gathered from the Thomson Financial 
Datastream database while figures on Australian GDP and imports were obtained from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 












































Source: Waterline, issues 1-39, Tables “Non-financial performance indicators, selected Australian ports”, 
Full import. 
                                                 
7 Final Demand = Household Final Consumption Expenditure + Government Final Consumption 
Expenditure + Private Gross Capital Formation + Public Gross Capital Formation.  See Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), Components of State Final Demand. 














































Source: Waterline, issues 1-39, Tables “Port and related charges for ships in the 15,000- 20,000 GT 
range”, Total port and related charges ($/TEU)- Loaded imports 
 
 
































































* Final Demand = Household and Government Final Consumption Expenditure + Private and Public 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream, aggregated on the basis of quarterly data for the following series: 
AU Final Demand- New South Wales, AU Final Demand- ACT, AU Final Demand- Queensland and AU 
Final Demand- Victoria. All of them are constant price, seasonally adjusted series. 
 
  9Figures (1) to (3) present trends in import volume, prices charged and final 
demand that can be attributed to ports’ operational areas (Queensland to the Port of 
Brisbane, NSW and ACT to Sydney, Victoria to Melbourne).  All of the ports in the 
study showed a considerable reduction in fees charged in the early period - from 1993 
until the first half of 2000 - with stable or gradually increasing charges from the year 
2000 on.  The sharpest drop in charges occurred in the Port of Melbourne where they 
declined by around 50% between 1993 and 2000. 
In spite of this remarkable drop in charges it was the Port of Brisbane that 
exhibited the most impressive growth in the number of imported containers- during the 
sample period the number of full containers imported (in TEUs) via Brisbane 
quadrupled while at the same time there were rises of 126% and 106% in Melbourne 
and Sydney respectively.  The rapid expansion of Brisbane’s port activity was clearly 
associated with the comparatively rapid growth of the Queensland economy - total final 
demand rose there by 80% during the sample period with growth figures for Victoria 
and combined NSW and ACT being respectively 68 and 57%. 
 
5. Estimating Elasticities of Substitution 
  The first step is to estimate the elasticities of substitution between service 
varieties.  As the ports are at different distances from one another and lie in different 
geographical regions it is very unlikely that the elasticity of substitution between them 
would be the same for all 3 ports under study.  As a result, the following analysis 
provides an estimation of “pair-wise” elasticities of substitution for all combinations: 
Brisbane- Sydney, Brisbane-Melbourne and Sydney- Melbourne.  
Firstly, however, we need to use the theory developed in Section 3 to derive an 
equation that is readily estimated.  By combining equations (8) and (6), and dropping 











 where   is total demand for the services of the ports sector, i.  
Assume, first, that all demanded quantity is readily supplied by firms.  Then, to account 
for the effects of changes in overall income and in trade policy we incorporate in the 
equation (state) GDP
ˆ C
8 as well as the quotient of imports to national GDP as a measure 
                                                 
8 GDP of Queensland for the Port of Brisbane, of NSW for Sydney Ports and Victoria for the Port of 
Melbourne as these are the primary areas served by these ports 
  10of openness of the Australian economy.
9  With these incorporations, the share of the 
output of services by port j in the pair-wise sum of port services supplied is: 
(15)  ˆˆˆ ˆ




⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, 
where σ  is the elasticity of substitution between services of the two ports in question, 
j y  is the GDP contribution of hinterland region j,   is total GDP contribution of the 
two state hinterlands, Y is national GDP and M is national imports.  After taking natural 
logarithms, this relationship collapses to the following: 
ˆ Y
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which might be readily estimated as: 
(17)  01 2 3 ln ln ln ln ˆˆ ˆ
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where   provides an estimate for  1
^
β σ − . 
  Quantities in equation (17) denote the number of full TEUs imported through a 
port while prices are the sum of all cargo-based and ship-based fees charged by the port 
for imports of a representative TEU container.
10  Since every regression was run for a 
“pair” of ports,   - the total number of full TEUs imported always denotes the total 
number of full TEUs imported through both ports in a given pair.  Consequently, it 
differs for every regression.  Similarly,   is always a composite of prices charged by 










According to Augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests, some of the series 
used in estimation of equation (17) were  (1) I  (these were: relative quantities exchanged 
and relative prices charged for the Melbourne- Sydney pair and relative state GDPs for 
the Brisbane-Sydney pair).  This finding contradicts the usual econometric intuition 
                                                 
9 Openness of Australian economy is measured as the ratio of imports to GDP in a given year 
10 Ship-based fees include charges for conservancy, pilotage, towage, mooring/unmooring, berth hire and 
the charge based on a ship’s tonnage. Cargo-based charges include wharfage, harbour dues and berthing.  
In some instances prices for imports and exports are not the same. Waterline, issues 1-39, Tables “Port 
and related charges for ships in the 15,000- 20,000 GT range”. 
11 It is then the sum of Qld and NSW GDPs when the ports of Brisbane and Sydney are considered and 
sum of NSW and Vic GDPs for a Sydney- Melbourne pair. 
  11whereby variables that are shares or in other ways bounded variables [variables with 
possible values restricted to closed sets like ( ) 0;1 ] are most commonly assumed to be 
stationary.  In case of the 3 time series in question, however, a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root was most likely caused by the structural break in the quantities 
and prices series around the year 2000, when the prices charged in Melbourne relative 
to Sydney levelled off after a period of a sharp decline causing a reversal in the relative 
quantities exchanged trend as well. The same story is true for the relative Brisbane-
Sydney state GDPs series where around the year 2000 the GDP in Queensland started to 
grow steadily (relative to GDPs of NSW and ACT) after a period of rather stable 
relative growth until the year 2000. In view of this, we assume that results from ADF 
tests suggesting non-stationarity in these series were due to structural breaks and in 




On the presumption that the quotients in (17) are all stationary, all regressions 
were performed in the levels.  Two complications arise in the estimation.  First, 
quantities and prices are determined simultaneously in (17), so consistent estimates 
required the use of instrumental variables for the prices.  The instrument for 
t
ij p  was 
chosen to be its lagged value,
1 t
ij p
− . Second, as (3) shows,  i σ  is actually required in the 
calculation of  .  An iterative procedure is therefore adopted with the initial value of  ˆ
i P
i σ  taken to be -2.  In each case the estimator of  i σ  quickly converged and was 
independent of the initial value chosen. 
Anomalous results arise for the Brisbane- Melbourne pair in that the estimators 
for 1 β  are positive and statistically significant.  This is contradictory to economic 
intuition and to our definition in Section 3.  It suggests that the ports of Brisbane and 
Melbourne are too far apart for the users to substitute between them, especially 
considering that there is another port midway between them.  In what follows, therefore, 
only results for the Brisbane-Sydney and Sydney-Melbourne pairings are discussed. 
                                                 
12 Another argument enforcing this line of thinking is that residual series from all 4 regressions in levels 
pass safely stationarity tests and are all found to be stationary. This suggests that regressions in levels 
give us reliable estimates for the elasticity of substitution between services of ports. Special thanks for 
clearing out this issue are due to Heather Anderson from the School of Economics, Australian National 
University. 
  12Table 1 summarizes the results of regression (17) for all pair-wise combinations 
of ports
13.  The results suggest that the sensitivity of shipping agents to differences in 
port fees is not high.  It seems that port fees are most influential when agents decide 
between the ports of Brisbane and Sydney, where the elasticity of substitution is close to 
–1 (keeping all other things equal, a 1% increase in a port fee in one of these ports is 
expected to result in an average decrease of a market share in containerised imports by 
1%).  For the ports of Sydney and Melbourne fees do not appear to play an important 
role as the elasticity of substitution for this pair is about –0.1.  One possible explanation 
for this may be that many ships call at more than one port.  Those calling at Sydney also 
exchanged goods at other ports on the east coast while ships calling at Melbourne were 
arriving along the southern coast of Australia, calling also at Fremantle and perhaps 
Adelaide.  By this reasoning the low elasticity of substitution between Melbourne and 
Sydney would be caused by the fact that ships calling at these ports were actually 
serving different regions, with Sydney the key East Coast port while Melbourne is 
recognised as the main port of the Southern Coast. 
  One of the major reasons behind the continuous growth in Brisbane’s market 
share in recent years has been Queensland’s comparatively rapid economic growth.  The 
regression results suggest that, keeping other things equal, a 1% expansion in the share 
of Queensland in Australia’s overall output resulted in an average growth in market 
share of the Port of Brisbane by 3%.  This local GDP effect in explaining containerised 
imports in the Brisbane-Sydney pair was also the only significant effect in regression 
(17) at the 5% confidence level.  The fact that all coefficients relating to fees charged by 
ports proved to be insignificant indicates that the results should be interpreted with 
caution, though the comparative weakness of the substitution estimates might also be 
due to the limited number of observations. 
 
6. Estimates for price collusion 
  Estimates for conjectural variations parameters,  ij µ , can be obtained directly by 
studying the relationships between prices charged by the three ports under study (Figure 











 for every  .  kj ≠
                                                 
13 For detailed e-VIEWS output for all regressions please see Appendix 2. 
  13All of the price series are non-stationary and , however ) 1 ( I
14.  Applying Johansen’s 
cointegration test procedure to pairs of price series confirms that there is no 
cointegration between both pairs of price series of interest (Brisbane and Sydney as well 
as Sydney and Melbourne)
15.  In view of this, consistent estimates for the conjectural 
variations parameters can be found by performing regressions with differenced prices.  
The following is the regression equation for the Brisbane-Sydney and Sydney-
Melbourne pairs: 
(19)  01 kt jt t pp β βε ∆=+ ∆+  
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained.  All of these estimates are statistically 
insignificant and give rather low estimates for conjectural variations parameters.  By 
itself, this suggests that, “pair-wise” at least, there is no significant Brisbane-Sydney or 
Sydney-Melbourne collusion in prices.  On the other hand, the Johansen cointegration 
test indicates a strong relationship between the prices charged in Brisbane and 
Melbourne.  For this pairing, the estimated conjectural variations parameter is of the 
order of 0.7.  The explanation of this phenomenon may have to do with similarities 
between the regulatory regimes to which Brisbane and Melbourne ports are subjected.  
Since pricing by the port of Sydney is not regulated in the same manner, its prices 
appear to move independently. 
 
7. Elasticity of Demand and Mark-Ups Charged 
  Now that estimates are available of both the elasticities of substitution and the 
conjectural variations parameters we can use equation (12) to calculate elasticities of 
demand faced by each port.  Bearing in mind that the ports are considered in pairs, and 
so   is a pair-wise CES price index, we obtain:  ˆ P
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14 ADF tests for unit roots are presented in Appendix 4.  As all price series appear to exhibit a downward 
trend a time trend was added to the test regression.  The number of lags for the differenced dependent 
variable was chosen on the basis of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
15 The very same cointegration test procedure indicates strong cointegration between prices charged in 
Brisbane and Melbourne, however.  This result means that, “econometrically”, there is a long-run 
relationship between prices charged at Brisbane and Melbourne.  It is certainly an interesting finding, 
especially given that the results from the previous section indicate that the markets of the ports of 
Melbourne and Brisbane do not overlap and there is no direct competition between them.  However 
strange this finding might seem, it has a relatively easy explanation: starting from mid-1990s both ports of 
Brisbane and Melbourne were subject to price regulation (price-cap regulation for Melbourne and price 
monitoring in Brisbane) which pushed their prices down.  To the present, prices charged in Sydney have 
not been regulated and therefore they do not exhibit any correlation to prices charged at other ports. 
  14where the   are shares, within the pairing, averaged throughout the sample period. i s
16  
The average elasticities of demand follow as listed in Table 3.
17
In this case we assume that the only competitor of Brisbane in container services 
is Sydney which is also Melbourne’s only competitor.  Because Sydney has two 
competitors, Melbourne and Brisbane, the overall elasticity of demand it perceives 
could be larger than that indicated here.  Given these elasticities, the Lerner formula 



















That for Brisbane turns out to be 9.6, while those for the other ports are outside the 
theoretical range of the model.
18  These results suggest that the market interactions 
between the three ports are weak and that each has considerable monopoly power.  
Regulation clearly plays a key role in pricing by all three ports.  The only departure 
from this to emerge is that the services of the ports of Brisbane and Sydney are the most 
substitutable and hence that measurable competition exists between them.  This implies 
that, while the regulation of the Port of Melbourne needs to be very restrictive, 
substitutability between Brisbane and Sydney could allow less restrictive regulation of 
at least one of these ports. 
To assess the power of the regulatory frameworks under which each port 
operates we have estimated the actual mark-up ratios charged by them.  A difficulty 
with this is the separation of recurrent fixed costs, which may be comparatively high in 
the lower-volume ports.  Comparisons between ports might therefore be less robust than 
those over time.  Our best estimates of the mark-up ratios are listed in Table 4 for the 
financial years 2001/02 through to 2004/05.
19  They range from 1.7 for the port of 
Melbourne to 3.3 for Brisbane.  The results suggest that relatively strict regulation in 
case of the Port of Melbourne Corporation has brought desirable outcomes in the form 
of the steady fall in mark-ups throughout the period of study.  Indeed, Melbourne seems 
at the moment to be the most competitive port on the east coast.  Mark-ups charged by 
                                                 
16 The average shares throughout the sample period are as follows: Brisbane in Brisbane-Sydney 0.2318, 
Sydney in Brisbane-Sydney 0.7682, Melbourne in Melbourne-Sydney 0.5385, Sydney in Melbourne-
Sydney 0.4615. 
17 Subscript b_bs means “Brisbane in Brisbane- Sydney pair”, s_bs means “Sydney in Brisbane- Sydney 
pair” and so on. 
18 The Lerner formula given by equation (13) returns negative mark-ups for elasticities of demand, i ε , 
with smaller absolute value than –1. 
19 For a detailed description of our method and calculations please see Appendix 1. 
  15the Sydney Ports Corporation were, on the other hand, continuously increasing.  Among 
the large ports on the east coast Brisbane managed to maintain the highest level of 
mark-ups charged, though this could be explained by Brisbane’s considerably smaller 
volume and therefore its (likely) higher recurrent fixed costs.  Clearly, regulation of port 
service pricing plays a critical role in all three of these Eastern States. 
 
8. Conclusion 
  Elasticities of substitution between the services of Australia’s East Coast ports 
are estimated to be quite low - around –1 between services of ports of Brisbane and 
Sydney and around –0.1 between those of the ports of Sydney and Melbourne.  The 
possible reasons for this are: 
•  large distances between ports which make it unprofitable to use services of 
another port even if differences in fees charged by ports are substantial 
•  long-term arrangements that most of shipping lines sign with port authorities 
•  restrained competition among shipping lines which might prevent them from 
adjusting to differences in prices charged by ports 
•  separation between the Southern and Eastern shipping routes, rendering port 
substitution costly 
•  estimation difficulties that could bias the estimated elasticities downward. 
The low elasticities of substitution imply that, even without price collusion by 
port authorities, varietal elasticities of demand are small and optimal oligopolistic mark-
ups over average variable cost are very large.  The fact that actual mark-ups are well 
below these levels is a testament to regulation, particularly in the case of the port of 
Melbourne.  The measurable substitutability between Brisbane and Sydney, combined 
with the weaker price regulation to which the port of Brisbane is subjected, may act to 
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Table 1: Summary of regression results from the elasticity of 
substitution equations 
Equation   Estimator 
for  i σ  
Std error, 
i σ estimator 
Estimator 
for  i η  
Std error, 
i η estimator 
Estimator 
for  i γ  
Std error, 
















-0.111 0.119 0.955 0.716 0.228  0.122 
Source: Regression results reported in the text. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of regression results from the conjectural variations 
equations 
Equation   Estimator for  i µ  Std  error,  i µ  estimator 
Brisbane in Brisbane- 
Sydney pair 
0.268 0.203 
Sydney in Brisbane- Sydney 
pair 
0.206 0.149 
Melbourne in Melbourne- 
Sydney pair 
0.422 0.223 
Sydney in Melbourne- 
Sydney pair 
0.346 0.183 




Table 3: Estimated demand elasticities for port services 
Equation   Estimator for ε  
Brisbane in Brisbane- 
Sydney pair,  _ bb s ε  
-1.116 
Sydney in Brisbane- Sydney 
pair,  _ s bs ε  
-0.981 
Melbourne in Melbourne- 
Sydney pair,  _ mm s ε  
-0.704 
Sydney in Melbourne- 
Sydney pair,  _ s ms ε  
-0.745 





  18Table 4: Estimated Actual Mark-Up Ratios Charged by Ports 
Port/  Year  2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Melbourne  2.49 2.23 1.70 1.98 
Sydney  2.09 2.39 2.57 2.64 
Brisbane  3.34 2.85 3.08 N/A 
Source: Annual Reports: Port of Melbourne Corporation (Melbourne Port Corporation) 2002/03, 
2003/04, 2004/05; Sydney Ports Corporation 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05; Port of Brisbane 
Corporation 2002/03, 2003/04. See Appendix 1 for detailed methodology and calculation.
  19Appendix 1: Calculation of mark-ups for the Sydney Ports 




Port of Melbourne Corporation 
 
Year  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total Revenue from 
ordinary activity (TR)
1
83.4 90.2  101.8  124.6 





35.3 42.5 62.9 66.3 
Variable Costs (VC)
4 33.5 40.4 59.8 63.0 
Mark-ups  (TR/VC)  2.49 2.23 1.70 1.98 
Average mark-up: 2.10 
 
Sydney Ports Corporation 
 
Year  2002 2003 2004  2005 
Total Revenue from 
ordinary activity (TR)
1
106.4 119.7 132.4  147.1 





53.7 52.6 54.3  58.7 
Variable Costs (VC)
4 51.0 50.0 51.6  55.8 
Mark-ups  (TR/VC)  2.09 2.39 2.57  2.64 
Average mark-up: 2.42 
 
 
Port of Brisbane Corporation 
 
Year  2002 2003 2004 
Total Revenue from 
ordinary activity (TR)
1
96.4 106.9  108.9 





30.4 39.5 37.3 
Variable Costs (VC)
4 28.9 37.5 35.4 
Mark-ups  (TR/VC)  3.34 2.85 3.08 
Average mark-up: 3.09 
 
1 Revenues from ordinary activity 
2 Capital opportunity costs were calculated as the value of infrastructure, property, plant 
and equipment times the reference rate of return (equal to 5.5%). 
3 This includes expenses from ordinary activities, excluding borrowing costs, capital 
opportunity costs and depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
4 Variable costs are set as equal to 0.95 of “Costs” as it was assumed that 5% of costs 
not already excluded were also fixed costs.
  20Appendix 2: E-views output from regressions for Ports of Brisbane 
and Sydney   
Dependent Variable: LOG(SHAREBRISB_BS_FULLIMP) 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares   
Date: 12/07/05   Time: 11:08     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Instrument list: C LOG(RELPRBRISB_IT2_BS_IMP(-1)) 
        LOG(RELY_BRISB_BS) LOG(OPENNESS_GS)   
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob.   
C -1.302933 1.500106 -0.868560  0.3959 
LOG(RELPRBRISB_IT2_BS_IMP) -1.162617 1.176328 -0.988344  0.3354 
LOG(RELY_BRISB_BS) 3.200879 1.676767 1.908959  0.0715 
LOG(OPENNESS_GS) 1.190325 0.270051 4.407785 0.0003 
R-squared  0.912530     Mean dependent var  -1.466362 
Adjusted R-squared  0.898719     S.D. dependent var  0.178349 
S.E. of regression  0.056759     Sum squared resid  0.061210 
F-statistic  64.37734     Durbin-Watson stat  2.100237 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000      
 














































ijt ln 190 . 1 ln 201 . 3 ln 163 . 1 303 . 1 ln ^ ^ ^
^
 
       (1.500)  (1.176)         (1.677)          (0.270) 
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Dependent Variable: LOG(SHARESYD_BS_FULLIMP)  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares   
Date: 12/07/05   Time: 12:35     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Instrument list: C LOG(RELPRSYD_IT3_BS_IMP(-1)) 
        LOG(RELY_SYD_BS) LOG(OPENNESS_GS)    
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.686363 0.557331 3.025784 0.0070 
LOG(RELPRSYD_IT3_BS_IMP)  -0.776927 1.022697 -0.759684 0.4568 
LOG(RELY_SYD_BS) 2.553299 0.920027 2.775244 0.0121 
LOG(OPENNESS_GS) -0.325298 0.073433 -4.429847 0.0003 
R-squared  0.934624     Mean dependent var  -0.268466 
Adjusted R-squared  0.924301     S.D. dependent var  0.055793 
S.E. of regression  0.015351     Sum squared resid  0.004477 
F-statistic  87.19747     Durbin-Watson stat  2.184998 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000      
 














































ijt ln 325 . 0 ln 553 . 2 ln 777 . 0 686 . 1 ln ^ ^ ^
^
 
     (0.557) (1.023)        (0.920)          (0.073) 
 
  22Appendix 3: E-views output from regressions for Ports of Sydney and 
Melbourne  
Dependent Variable: LOG(SHAREMELB_MS_FULLIMP) 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares   
Date: 12/07/05   Time: 13:57     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Instrument list: C LOG(RELPRMELB_IT2_MS_IMP(-1)) 
        LOG(RELY_MELB_MS) LOG(OPENNESS_GS)   
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob.   
C 0.417959 0.388976 1.074509  0.2961 
LOG(RELPRMELB_IT2_MS_IMP) -0.108396 0.086706 -1.250155  0.2264 
LOG(RELY_MELB_MS) 0.440882 0.385765 1.142877  0.2673 
LOG(OPENNESS_GS) -0.212659 0.101090 -2.103650 0.0490 
R-squared  0.458035     Mean dependent var  -0.619053 
Adjusted R-squared  0.372461     S.D. dependent var  0.022374 
S.E. of regression  0.017724     Sum squared resid  0.005969 
F-statistic  5.975772     Durbin-Watson stat  1.809396 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004785      
 














































ijt ln 213 . 0 ln 441 . 0 ln 108 . 0 418 . 0 ln ^ ^ ^
^
 
      (0.389) (0.087)        (0.386)         (0.101) 
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Dependent Variable: LOG(SHARESYD_MS_FULLIMP)  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares   
Date: 12/07/05   Time: 14:08     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Instrument list: C LOG(RELPRSYD_IT2_MS_IMP(-1)) 
        LOG(RELY_SYD_MS) LOG(OPENNESS_GS)   
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.965242 0.592713 -1.628516 0.1199 
LOG(RELPRSYD_IT2_MS_IMP)  -0.111493 0.118664 -0.939568 0.3592 
LOG(RELY_SYD_MS) 0.954902 0.716198 1.333293 0.1982 
LOG(OPENNESS_GS) 0.227503 0.122272 1.860620 0.0783 
R-squared  0.457620     Mean dependent var  -0.773792 
Adjusted R-squared  0.371981     S.D. dependent var  0.026664 
S.E. of regression  0.021131     Sum squared resid  0.008484 
F-statistic  5.796447     Durbin-Watson stat  1.800017 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005465      
 














































ijt ln 228 . 0 ln 955 . 0 ln 111 . 0 965 . 0 ln ^ ^ ^
^
 
        (0.593) (0.119)          (0.716)           (0.122) 




Null Hypothesis: PRBR has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.276550   0.8670 
Test critical values:  1% level    -4.440739   
 5%  level    -3.632896   
 10%  level    -3.254671   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
        
        
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(PRBR)     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/05/06   Time: 15:52     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S2 2005S1   
Included observations: 22 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PRBR(-1) -0.424232  0.332327 -1.276550 0.2180 
D(PRBR(-1)) -0.496962  0.245108 -2.027518 0.0577 
C 51.75656  43.14511 1.199593 0.2459 
@TREND(1993S2) -0.376344  0.450361 -0.835650 0.4143 
R-squared  0.493728     Mean dependent var  -0.613182 
Adjusted R-squared  0.409350     S.D. dependent var  6.975868 
S.E. of regression  5.361217     Akaike info criterion  6.359225 
Sum squared resid  517.3677     Schwarz criterion  6.557596 
Log likelihood  -65.95147     F-statistic  5.851347 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.661199     Prob(F-statistic)  0.005676 
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Null Hypothesis: PRSYD has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.878051   0.6330 
Test critical values:  1% level    -4.416345   
 5%  level    -3.622033   
 10%  level    -3.248592   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
        
        
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(PRSYD)     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/05/06   Time: 15:54     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PRSYD(-1) -0.319703  0.170231 -1.878051 0.0750 
C 28.12072  16.50429 1.703843 0.1039 
@TREND(1993S2) 0.086350  0.155816 0.554179 0.5856 
R-squared  0.218772     Mean dependent var  -0.196522 
Adjusted R-squared  0.140649     S.D. dependent var  4.887197 
S.E. of regression  4.530490     Akaike info criterion  5.980645 
Sum squared resid  410.5068     Schwarz criterion  6.128753 
Log likelihood  -65.77742     F-statistic  2.800356 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.860442     Prob(F-statistic)  0.084680 
 
  26 
Null Hypothesis: PRMEL has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=5) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -1.183230   0.8903 
Test critical values:  1% level    -4.416345   
 5%  level    -3.622033   
 10%  level    -3.248592   
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
        
        
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(PRMEL)     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/05/06   Time: 15:55     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PRMEL(-1) -0.170628  0.144206 -1.183230 0.2506 
C 11.90175  14.56711 0.817029 0.4235 
@TREND(1993S2) -0.166515  0.391221 -0.425629 0.6749 
R-squared  0.160916     Mean dependent var  -2.078696 
Adjusted R-squared  0.077007     S.D. dependent var  5.396058 
S.E. of regression  5.184128     Akaike info criterion  6.250188 
Sum squared resid  537.5036     Schwarz criterion  6.398296 
Log likelihood  -68.87716     F-statistic  1.917755 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.360973     Prob(F-statistic)  0.173004 
 
 




Dependent Variable: DPRBR     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/05/06   Time: 16:16     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S2 2005S1   
Included observations: 22 after adjustments   
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.678309  0.662423 -1.023980 0.3187 
DPRSYD 0.268196  0.202500 1.324422 0.2011 
AR(1) -0.723262  0.189709 -3.812484 0.0012 
R-squared  0.477948     Mean dependent var  -0.613182 
Adjusted R-squared  0.422996     S.D. dependent var  6.975868 
S.E. of regression  5.298925     Akaike info criterion  6.299009 
Sum squared resid  533.4935     Schwarz criterion  6.447787 
Log likelihood  -66.28910     F-statistic  8.697436 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.825395     Prob(F-statistic)  0.002081 




Dependent Variable: DPRMEL     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/05/06   Time: 16:18     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1.995835  1.065255 -1.873575 0.0750 
DPRSYD 0.421637  0.222679 1.893475 0.0722 
R-squared  0.145829     Mean dependent var  -2.078696 
Adjusted R-squared  0.105154     S.D. dependent var  5.396058 
S.E. of regression  5.104470     Akaike info criterion  6.181052 
Sum squared resid  547.1679     Schwarz criterion  6.279790 
Log likelihood  -69.08209     F-statistic  3.585246 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.200333     Prob(F-statistic)  0.072156 
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Dependent Variable: DPRSYD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/05/06   Time: 16:20     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.102316  1.000956 -0.102218 0.9196 
DPRBR 0.205767  0.148930 1.381641 0.1816 
R-squared  0.083327     Mean dependent var  -0.196522 
Adjusted R-squared  0.039676     S.D. dependent var  4.887197 
S.E. of regression  4.789264     Akaike info criterion  6.053572 
Sum squared resid  481.6781     Schwarz criterion  6.152310 
Log likelihood  -67.61608     F-statistic  1.908931 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.049757     Prob(F-statistic)  0.181606 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DPRSYD     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 07/05/06   Time: 16:21     
Sample (adjusted): 1994S1 2005S1   
Included observations: 23 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.522424  1.036067 0.504238 0.6193 
DPRMEL 0.345864  0.182661 1.893475 0.0722 
R-squared  0.145829     Mean dependent var  -0.196522 
Adjusted R-squared  0.105154     S.D. dependent var  4.887197 
S.E. of regression  4.623107     Akaike info criterion  5.982952 
Sum squared resid  448.8354     Schwarz criterion  6.081691 
Log likelihood  -66.80395     F-statistic  3.585246 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.861613     Prob(F-statistic)  0.072156 
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